Correspondences and similarities between ideas in shamanism and ideas in contemporary cognitive science are considered. The importance of interconnectedness in the web of life worldview characteristic of shamanism and in connectionist models of semantic memory in cognitive science, and the extension of meaning to elements of the natural world in shamanism and indistributed cognition, are considered. Cognitive consequences ofsuch an extension (e.g., use of representativeness and intentional stance heuristics, magical thinking, social attribution errors, and social in-group/out-group differences) are discussed. It is suggested that attributions of mental states, beliefs, and desires to a computer on the basis of behavioral measures (e.g., the Turing test) is consistent with the extension of meaning and intentionality to nonhuman elements of the natural world in shamanism. In general, the existence ofsuch correspondencesand similarities suggests that elements of shamanism may reflect cognitive structures and processes that are also used by nonshamans and in nonshamanic settings. Key words:shamdnism, cognition, intentional stance, extension of meaning Western science has often considered shamanic ideas and experience to reflect psychopathology or regressive behavior (e.g., Devereaux 1961; Sil verman 1967;but see Noll 1983; Walsh 2001), charlatanism or trickery (e.g., Hansen 2001 Warner 1980) , or the lack of a Western education (e.g., depictions in Frazer 1963;Levi-Strauss I966;Tylor I871);however,oflatethere has been a resurgence of interest in the possible validity of shamanic ideas and phenomena (e.g., Harner 1990; Kr ippner 2000 Kr ippner ,2002 Ripinsky-Naxon 1993 jWinkelman 2000. The purpose here is to consider correspondences and similarities between ideas in shamanism and ideas in contemporary cognitive science. Part I focuses on similarities of the web of life worldview of shamanism and neural networkmodelsof memory incognitive science, and argues that meaning isextended into the natural world both in shamanism and in cognitive science. Part II focuseson the social consequences ofsuch an extension of meaning into the natural world, the attribution of intentionality to nonhuman elements of the natural world, and how such consequences and attributions are consistent with theories in social cognition. Part III suggests the attribution of cognitive abilities to so-called "artificially intelligent" computer systems in cognitive science reflects the same type of extension of meaning and intentionality asthat attributed by shamans to nonhuman elementsof the natural world.
cognitive abilities to so-called "artificially intelligent" computer systems in cognitive science reflects the same type of extension of meaning and intentionality asthat attributed by shamans to nonhuman elementsof the natural world.
Part I: Webs of Life and Neural Networks
One area in which the viewsof cognitive science andof shamanism exhibit correspondences andsimilarities is in the use of network modelsto describe the organization and functioning of their respective domains. Furthermore, propertiesofnetworkmodelsofsemanticmemory in cognitive science have drawn increasingly closer to properties of the web of life view of the natural world held by shamans.
The Web of Life
The web of life is an ancient idea that emphasizes the interdependence and interconnection of all living form s, and this v ie w of the natural world characterizes pre-industrial or hunter-gatherer societies in which shamanism is more likely to be found. Different speciesare seen as different nodes in a larger web, and these different nodes are connected by various types of linkages that reflect howthe actions, presence, or absence of members of any given species depends upon the actions, presence, or absence of membersof other speciesThe imagery of a webof life suggestsa complex tapestry in which the successand vitality of each organism isdependent upon the successand vitality of other organisms (e.g., without the oxygen given off by plants, animals would die, but without the carbon dioxidegivenoffby animals, plants woulddie; similarly, ifthere are toomany predators, prey die off, but ifthere are not enough predators, prey overrun their niche). The integrity and functioning of a web requiresthat all elements thusbe in the proper place and relation to each other. If a web issufficiently damaged, then it will cease to function as a web, and even elements that were not previously damaged may no longer be able to function without input or support from the damaged elements (for an easily accessible account, see Capra 1996) .
Given the importance of interconnection in the web of life, the success and vitality of other species is in the best interest of an individual and of that individual's species, because the success and vitality of other species could directly (e.g., as a food source) or indirectly (e. g., by prey ing on predators) influence the vitality and success of that individual and of that individual's species.
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Because of the relationships of different species with other elementsof the web of life, aconcern with the well-being of other species and with the health of the web does not have to contend with traditional difficulties of accounting for altruism and other pro-social behaviors within a Darwinian framework. Thus, a concern with the larger web of life may be consistent with evolutionary principles. Along these lines,the ideaof the weboflife,andtheresultantnotion that the functioning of different organisms may contribute to and shape the survival of the more general ecosystem, is also consistent with the Gaia hypothesis of how life on Earth regulates its environment (for discussion of Gaia, see Lovelock 1979 Lovelock ,1988 Schneider and Boston 1991) . This largerGai an notion is consistent with sham an ic views of the whole of being as"an immense signal system" (Kalweit 1992) and of the universe as immersed in meaning (Eliade 1964).
Semantic Memory
The imagery of the web oflife, andthe interdependenceand interconnection of all liv ing form s, resembles recent network modelsof semantic memory within cognitive science. Semantic memory involves memory for "meaning," that is, memory for facts and descriptions,and consists of general, abstract, and conceptual knowledge (e.g., Schacter 1996; Tulving 1983) . It is with recent connectionist models that the similarities of network models of semantic memory and the web of life are the strongest, but rather than jump directly to a consideration of these contemporary models, it would be useful to first present a brief digression on the history of network models of semantic memory. Such a digression will underscore how advances in theorizing about semantic memory have progressively approached the notion of connectivity that is such a critical aspect of the web of life.
Hierarchical Models. In earlier modelsof semantic memory, information was organized in a hierarchical manner, with subordinate categor ies at the bottom of the hierarchy and superordinate categoriesat the topofthe hierarchy (e.g., Collins and Quillian 1968). Concepts were represented by nodes, nodes were connected by class inclusion linkages, and information was stored atthe most general level possible (see topof Figure 1 ). When a node received sufficient stimulation, then that node was said to be "activated." How might a node be stimulated or activated? One way is by perceiving some object that correspondstothe information represented by that node(e.g, looking at an automobile would activate the node for "automobile,"hear ing the word"dog" would activate the node for "dog"). A second way is by directed memory search (e.g., searching memory for nodes that included the information "yellow" and "flies" would activate "canary"). Each node had a thresholdlevel for activation, andmore frequent, salient, orrecently-activated nodes would have lower thresholds; if the stimulation level of agiven node surpassed that node's threshold, the node was activated and the contents of that node were brought into conscious awareness.
H ierarchical models could account for much of the empirical data known at the time those models were developed. Such data were based on the time required to answer simple questions regarding the properties of a given category.
2 For example, the time to respond to the question "Does a canary have skin?"is slower than the time to respond to the question "Does a canary have wings?" Similarly, the time to respond to the question"Does a canary have wings?"is slower dun the timetorespondto the question"Doesacanarysing?"Researchersaccountedforthesedifferences by positing that information was stored at the most general level possible (e.g., information regarding"skin"or"wings" was more general to"animals"and a birds,"and thus stored atthe"animals" and"birds"nodes, respectively, whereas information regarding"sings" was more specificto"canary," and thus stored at the"canary" node), and so more general information required more time to access because it was stored at a more distant node. In general, shorter response times suggested two pieces of information were stored more closely together, and the overall pattern of response times suggested that memory was organized in a hierarchical manner with property information (e.g., has skin, has wings, sings) stored at the most general level (e.g., canary, bird, animal) possible. Spreading Activation Models. In hierarchical models, all members of a category were represented at the same level and were presumed to be equally good exemplars of that category. However, subsequent research on human conceptual and category learning revealed that not all membersofa category are equally good exemplarsofthat category (for overviews, see Smith and Medin 1981; Rosch and Lloyd 1978) . For example, both cats and bats are mammals, but most people consider a cat to be a more typical or prototypical mammal than is a bat. Prototypical membersofacategory differ from nonprototypicalmembersofacategoryinanumberofways(e.g., prototypesare typically learned first and share more characteristic features), but hierarchical models in which all members of a category were at the same level cduldn't account for effects of prototypically. of linkages in which the length of a connection was inversely proportional to the strength of the association (see middle of Figure 1) . In such models, prototypes might be more closely or strongly linked to the concept node, and effects of prototypicality could be accounted for. Spreading activation models also provided abetter accounting of dataonprimingeffects than did hierarchical models. "Priming" refersto how the processing of an initial stimuluscan facilitate the processing of a subsequent stimulus, and this is most easily illustrated in 3 lexicaldecision task. In this task, observers view a string of letters on each trial, and they judge whether the string of letters forms a valid word or not (e.g., the string "NURSE" forms a valid word, but the string "JEGHN"does not form a valid word). Ifthe same string isrepeatedafterafewtrials(e.g.,aperson sees"NURSE"on the first trial and subsequently sees"NURSE"on alater trial), the judgment on the later trial will be faster, and this is called repetition priming (e.g., Brown etal. 1991 ;Jacobyand Dallas 1981). If adifferent but semantically related string is presented on a later trial (e.g., a person sees"NURSE"onthe first trial andthen sees"DOCTOR"on alater trial),thejudgmentofthe related item on the later trial will be faster, and this iscalled semantic priming (e.g., Meyer and Schvaneveldt 1971; Neely 1990 Spreading activation models accountfor priming effectsby suggesting that as soon asanode is activated, that activation starts to decay and also starts to spread along that node's linkages to related nodes. Ifthe same node is reactivated before the previousactivation has completely decayed, then it will not require as much time for subsequent activation to reach the threshold for awareness because any residual activation from the previous stimulation will give that node a"head start." Similarly, if a related node is activated before the activation that previously spread to that node decayed, then that related node will not require as much time for subsequent activation to reach the threshold for awareness because any residual activation that spread from the original node will give the related node a"head start."The stronger the association between two nodes, the shorter the linkage between those nodes, and the stronger the semantic priming. In such spreading activation models, though, knowledge was still stored locally at asingle node, and could be stored orretrieved by activation or accessofjust thatsinglenode.Theindividual node was still the primary unit of meaning, but the importance of the entire network for the functioning of each individual element was beginning to be emphasized, as even an otherwise intact node could not be accessed or would not function adequately if connections to that node were disrupted.
In more contemporary network modelsof semantic memory, information isnot stored locally at a single node, but isinstead distributed across the entire network (for overview, see Bechtel and Abrahamsen 1991; Rumelhart and McClelland 1986). For example, rather than having a single node for "canary" which contains a li st of features (e. g., is yellow, can sing), there would be separate nodes for each property (e.g., a separate node for "yellow," a separate node for "sings"), and knowledge would be represented by connections between those specific nodes(e.g. ,thenodefor "canary"would connect with nodes for"yellow"and"sings,"but would not connect [or would have inhibitory connections] with nodes for"blue"and"roars"). Thus, information isdistributedacross nodes rather than stored at a single node, and knowledge is preserved by the pattern of connectivity between nodes (see bottom of Figure 1) . Storage or retrieval of a specific piece of information requiresthe potential activation and participation of the entire network. These distributed models have been called connectionist models (e.g., McClelland 1988) , arid because they approach more closely to the types of processing thought to be engaged in by the brain (e.g. .connect ions between nodes have been likened to synapses between neurons, e.g., Feldman and Ballard 1982), such models have also been referred to as neural networks (e.g., Anderson 1995) .
Storing or retriev ing a specific piece of information in a connectionist network may involve the activation and participation of the entire network, and so all of the elements may be said to be connected or interrelated and to be involved in cognitive functioning. By stressing the interconnection and the importance of the entire pattern of activation across all nodes inanetwork ratherthan just the all-or-none activation of a specific node, contemporary connectionist models of semantic memory in cognitive science parallel the importance of the interconnection and the entire pattern of activity in the web of life. Inthecaseofcognitivescience, nodes may correspond to bits of information, individual neurons, or circuits and modules of cells, whereas in the case of shamanism, nodesmaycorrespondtoelementsofthenaturalorsupernatural world. Justasdamage to the web oflife diminishesthe vitality of species, so too does damage to a connectionist network of semantic memory decrease the completeness or vividnessof cognitivefunctioning; both in the weboflife and in connectionist models of semantic memory, we see a graceful degradation of vitality or completeness ratherthan acomplete lossof afew elements with no corresponding effect on the vitality or completeness of the remaining elements.
The Place of "Meaning"
Shamans traditionally placed information and connections throughout the natural world, whereas cognitive models of memory traditionally placed information and connections within the head. However, some cognitive theorists are beginning to suggest that neural networks place meaning"out inthe workTas well as in the head (e.g., see discussion in Hardy 1998). By considering meaning as "out in the world" rather than as existing solely "inside the head" or as a unique construction for each individual, connectionist models make functional connections between cognitive processes of the organism and elements of the external natural world more explicit. As a result, such models suggest that individual organisms (such as people) are connected to the elements in their environment. Even so, it might be objected that the connections of the internal neural network are clearly instantiated within visible physiological structures (i.e., synapses), but it is less clear what the equivalent structures are in the case of the external web oflife. Such an objectionmissesafundamental point: theconnectionsare/unctiona/,andassuch, neednot depend upon any single specific form of structural instantiation.
Given that meaning is an intrinsic part of connectionist models of semantic memory and also ofthe weboflife, meaning could provide a common thread with which to weave together neural networks and the natural world. This is consistent with recent approaches to cultural psychology which suggest that cognition is mediated by artifacts and that what we call"mind" must include theenvironmentalcontextwithinwhichcognitionisembedded(e.g.,seeCole 19%). Fbrexample, Bateson (1972) proposed the following thought experiment-."Suppose I am a bl ind man, and I use astick. Igo tap, tap, tap. Where do I start? Is my mental system bounded at the handle ofthe stick? Is it bounded by my skin? Does it start halfway up the stick? Does it start at the tip ofthe stick?" Bateson goeson to argue that such questions are nonsensical unless not just the man, but also the stick, purpose ofthe tapping, and environment are all taken into account; he concluded that "message pathways" exist outside the skin, and that these pathways and the messages they carry must be included as part ofthe mental system. Similarly, Hutchins (1995) described how the execution of one type of cognitivetask (navigation) might be viewed asa single cognitive activity distributed across several individuals.
These ideas suggest a shift or even dissolution of any functional boundaries between neural structures and the external environment such that cognition is "stretched across mind, body, activity, and setting" (Lave 1993), and are consistent with the idea that an individual's neural networkmay simply be the mitrostructureof asingle node in alarger functional network extending beyond the individual's body. A stretching of cognition to include"mind,body,activity,and setting" is also consistent with the shamanic view that the universe is saturated with meaning ( 
Part II: The Intentional Stance and Social Attribution
The attribution ofhuman-like beliefs, desires, and mental states to nonhuman elements of the natural worldhasnumerousimplicationsforhowhumansinteractwithelementsofthenatural world and for our consideration ofthe correspondencesand similaritiesof cognitive science and shamanism. Some implications ofthe idea that nonhuman elements ofthe natural world possess human-like beliefs, desires, and other mental states, and what such attributions suggest for the relationship between cognitive science and shamanism, will now be considered.
The Intentional Stance
The attribution of beliefs, desires, and other mental statesonto an object has been referred to as adopting an "intentional stance" toward that object (see Dennett 1987) . In the absence of other information, adoption of an intentional stance toward an object allowsan individual tomake predictions regarding the subsequent behavior ofthat object, andthose predictions are based upon a conceptualization ofthe object asa rational agent that possesses beliefs, desires, and other mental states. An intentional stance is different from a"physical stance"(in which expectations regarding an object's behavior are based on physical properties ofthat object) or a"design stance"(in which expectations regarding an object's behav ior are based on knowledge ofhow that object isdesigned to behave). Although in contemporary society an intentional stance may be useful in understanding or predicting the behavior of another person, a physical stance is more useful in dealing withmost material objects or substances (e.g., mixing paints to match a specific hue), and a design stance ismore useful in dealing with manufactured artifacts (e.g., repairing a malfunctioning automobile).
The general approach in shamanism is consistent with the adoption of an intentional stance toward nonhuman elements ofthe natural world. Adoption of an intentional stance toward the natural world would allow the shaman to use social interactions with other people, as well as knowledge ofthe self as a rational agent possessing beliefs, desires, and other mental states, asa tool or analogy to aid in attempts to predict, control, or explainthe behavior of some unknown elementofthe natural world. For example, another person might be violent or loud when angry, and so perhaps the violence or loudness of a storm might be interpreted as the anger of nature; a person who has been angered may sometimes be appeased by sacrifices and gifts, and so perhaps an angry naturemight be appeased by sacrifices and gifts. Analogoush/,activities that pleased nature mightresult in beneficent sunshine or gentle rains. Indeed, thissocial self might be considered as the soul or spirit (alternatively, a soul or spirit might be considered as the social self). Also, given that a person who is ill does not typically engage in social behavior, illness could be interpreted as a loss of that social agent or self; hence, illness was thought to be caused by a loss of the soul.
A New Heuristic
A shaman who attempted to cure an illness, ensure a successful hunt, or contact a supernatural realm would be faced with agreat deal ofuncertainty, even if knowledge of the self and of typical social interactions were used as guides. Contemporary research on problem-solving behavior in the face ofuncertainty has documented a number of strategies that people use when faced with problems; these strategiesare referred to is heuristics and are "short-cuts"or"rules-of-thumb" that offer approximate solutionsfor minimal cognitive effort (Kahneman, Slovic, andTversky 1982; seealsoGigerenzerandTodd 1999). Examplesofwell-knownheuristicsincluderepresentativeness (the likelihood that some object is a member of a set is determined by how closely that object resembles known members of that set), availability (the judged frequency of an item or category reflects how easily examples ofthat item or category may be remembered orperceived), adjustment and anchoring (the final estimation of the quantity of some category is influenced by the magnitude ofthe initial estimate), andhindsight bias (an overestimation ofhow well some outcome could have been predicted once that outcome is known to have happened).
To the list of known or suspected heuristics we might add an intentionality heuristic, which suggests that when individuals do not possess sufficient physical knowledge or design knowledge regarding an object, those individualsmay attribute intentionality to the object and treat that object as if it were a rational agent that possessed beliefs, desires, and other mental states. Thus, if a shaman didnothave sufficient physical knowledge or design knowledge regarding some nonhuman element of nature, then he or she would treat that element of nature as a rational agent that possessed bel ie fs, desires, and other mental states. Such a behavior is not limited to shamans or those in shamanic cultures, however. Even in our scientific and technological culture, it is a common observation that individuals without specific physical or design knowledge of technological artifacts may anthropomorphizethose artifacts (e.g., "that computer just doesn'tlike me"). Heuristic use of an intentional stance in both shamanic and nonshamanic settings reveals a similarity between the problem-solving of contemporary individuals in Western society and the problem-solving of shamans: both groups appeal to heuristics when faced with problem-solving in the face of uncertainty.
Magical Thinking
Although nonhuman elements ofthe natural world are clearly related in meaningful ways (e.g., biological taxa, geological strata), the extension of intentionality to nonhuman elements ofthe natural world suggests that elements of the natural world may be related in additional ways. Some of these additional relationships may be revealed through different types oPmagical thinking," which although common in shamanism, are considered immature or pathological by contemporary psychological science (e.g., see Zusne and Jones 1989).
Transmutation. One example of magical thinking involves transmutation in which one substance or object is transformed into another substance or object; for example, an individual who |U(2)J donsa false face maskin an Iroquois ceremony or akachinamaskin aHopi ceremony is considered to literally become the entity represented by that mask. More generally, a human wearing a mask or costume depicting some other entity such asa godor an animal isnot simply ahuman in disguise, he or she is that other entity. Such magical transmutationofalimited number of objects or substances is also found in cultures that are primarily nonshamanic (e.g., for a devout Western Catholic receiving communion, the wafer is transmuted into the flesh of Christ), and may involve the representativeness heuristic(e.g.,amask more closely resembles the entity re presented by that mask than it resembles the human being wearing the mask). More broadly, substances or objects that would be transmuted already closely resemble the substances or objects into which they would be transmuted (e.g., red wine into blood), and perhaps this resemblance facilitates the belief in transmutation.
Law of Similarity. Another example of magical thinking is the law of similarity in which"like affects like;"that is, a desired effect is believed to be more likely tooccur ifthe causemore closely resembles that effect (e.g., see Frazer 1963; Rozin, Millman,and Nemeroff 1986). For example, injuring or destroying an image of a person was believed in many cultures tobring injury or death to that person, as an image of a given individual resembles that individual more than it resembles any other individual (even if only in name). Analogously, some Northwestern Native American peoples believed that placing a painted image of a fish in the water would lead to the subsequent appearance of actual fish. Given that a painted image of a fish resembles a live fish more closely than perhaps anything else (other than another live fish) the shaman could place in the water, we again see the importance of resemblance. Similarly, in the medieval era the mandrake plant was believed to have medicinal value because its roots resemble the shapeofthe human body. In general, we may speculate that the law of similarity also depends (at least in part) on the representativeness heuristic, as the most effective cause isthought to be the one that most closely resemblesthe desired effect.
Law of Contagion. A final example of magical thinking involves the law of contagion which suggests that objects which have previously been in contact with each other continue to exert an influence on each other even after having been separated (e.g., see Frazer 1963) . Such a notion underlies voodoo (i.e., vodoun) and other rituals in which possession of some previous part of a person (e.g., a lock of hair or a fingernail clipping) or of an object previously worn or used by a person (e.g., a locket or a ring) may be used to influence that person. Similarly, the items in the medicine bundle of a shaman may be believed to convey the power of their place of origin to the shaman. Intriguingly, the law of contagion may also be consistent with the possibility of nonlocal effects inquantum physics/because what appears as a nonlocal interaction of subatomic partides ifviewed within the framework of the observed particlesmay be a local interaction ifviewed within alarger framework containing both the observerandthe observed. Such a larger framework would be consistent with the integration of the neural network of the individual and the web of life discussed earlier, and so we may speculate that effects attributed to contagion in magical thinking (as well as nonlocal effects and any effects attributed to the presence or actions of the observer in quantum physics) might reflect functional connections between the individual's neural network and the natural world (see also Hardy 1998).
Locus of Control
The lawsof sim ilarity and contagion may offer (the illusion of) control over forces that would otherwise seem uncontrollable. In addition to allowing agreater perceived prediction or control, appeal to shamanic techniques may redirect the locusof control of an individual from a nonhuman element ofthe natural world to a human shaman. Locus ofcontro/referstoanindividual'stendency to believe that either external or internal factors control events in his or her life (for review, see Lefcourt 1976) ; in general,an "internal locus" (in which the individual can predict or control events) leads to more adaptive or healthy responding than does an"external locus"(in which the indiv idual can neither predict nor control events). Shamanic and other magical techniques may provide the perception of a more internal locusof control for the individual, family, or clan, thus helping that individual, family, or clan cope more easily with the difficulties of an uncertain situation. Consistent with this, Malinowski (1954; see also Jahoda 1969) observed that practices based on magical thinking are engaged in only during circumstances in which other knowledge is insufficient for prediction or control, and this is also consistent with the notion that an intentional stance or intentional ity heuristic would be engaged in only if physical information or design information was not available.
Social Attribution
Adoption of an intentional stance toward some element ofthe natural world could make it seem more likely that such an element would be aware of an individual's desires or actions (and thus more likely to be influenced by appeals from that individual), whereas there m ight be no reason to suspect that an element ofthe natural world would be awareof an individual's desires or actions (or could be influenced by appeals from that individual) if an intentional stance toward that element was not adopted. Such an intentional relationship between a shaman and the natural world is strongly social, and so it might be expected that principlesof social cognition would influence how the shaman interprets actions of nonhuman elements ofthe natural world. One such group of principles concerns the attributions individuals make regarding the causes ofthe behavior of other people (for review, see Ross and Fletcher 1985) ,and whether those other people are perceived to be within one's social group (i.e. ,"like us") or in a different group (i.e. ,"not like us") plays a key role in one'sinteractions with those people. Indeed, this notion could be extended to include the attributions individuals make regarding the behavior of nonhuman elements of the natural world, and also how the attributions regarding the behavior of those elements play a key role in how those individuals react to the natural world.
Fundamental Attribution Error.The intentional stance adopted by shamanism toward the natural world suggests that biases exhibited in our explanation ofthe behavior of other humans would also be exhibited in the explanation ofthe behavior of nonhuman elements ofthe natural world. One such bias isthefundamentalattribution error, and thisreflects atendency to explain the actionsofanother human being as resulting from dispositionalor internal factors (e.g.,traits) rather than as resulting from situational or external factors (see Ross 1977) . If another person does not acknowledge us, we are more likely to perceive that person as acting as he did because "he is just that kind of per son" (e.g., he is rude or thoughtless) rather than because of any situational factors (e.g., he was in a hurry, he was preoccupied, etc.). Ifasimilarbiasisappliedtothe natural world, then any action of nature would be perceived to result from a trait or disposition of nature rather than from situational factors. For example, a falling rock or a violent storm would be attributed toa trait of nature (e.g., easy to anger) rather than to a situational factor (e.g., erosion of supporting soil or a clash of warm and cold air masses). Indeed, consistent with Malinowski's (1954) observation, a trait view of nature would be expected to be even more strongly favored when knowledge of the situational physical mechanisms (e.g., erosion, atmospheric dynamics) did not exist.
In-group/Out-group Differences.The shaman'sextension of intentional ity into the natural world should also result in an expansion of the in-groupof the shaman. Typically, the in-groupof an individual consists of a small set ofhumans with whom that individual is in some way affiliated, and these in-group membersare evaluatedmore positively and seen as more similartothe individual than are out-group members (for review, see Stephan 1985) . Extension of intentionality into the natural world would make the elementsof the natural world appear more similartothe individual, and thus more likely to be contained within the in-group of that individual; withdrawal of intentionality from the natural world would make the elements of the natural world appear less similartothe individual, and thus less likely to be contained within the in-groupof that individual. Furthermore, if a portion ofthe natural world is considered as part ofthe in-group(e.g., as in totemic relationships), then that portion ofthe natural world would presumably betreatedmore positively than would other portions ofthe natural world or than if that portion is not considered as part ofthe in-group. This isconsistent with observationsthat in shamanic societies thereare prohibitions against hunting, harming, or consuming one's totem animal, and these prohibitionsare analogous to the prohibitions against hunting, harming, or consuming other human beings within one's ingroup.
Perceived Similarity and Relatedness
The expansion ofthe in-groupto include nonhuman elementsentailsthat similarities between humans and those nonhuman elements now within the in-group would be more likely to be perceived. Indeed, shamanism stresses just such similarities, and the earlier consideration of the similaritiesof connectionist modelsof semantic memory and the weboflife worldviewalsobolsters the idea of such similarities between humans and nonhuman elementsof the natural world. The use of an intentional stance, as well as the attribution of dispositional or trait factors to nonhuman elements ofthe natural world, are also both consistent with such a perceived similarity ofhumans and nonhuman elements. Indeed, if nonhuman elementsofthe natural world were not perceived as similar to humans, then the sham an's knowledge of self and of other humans would not be used asa tool or analogy in dealing with those nonhuman elements, nor wouldthe behaviorof nonhuman elementsbe explained in wayssimilar to the explanation ofhuman behaviors. In additionto these social and behavioral examples ofperceived similarity and relatedness, linguistic examples may also befound(e.g.,theLakotagreeting"Aho-mitakayeoyacin"means"hellotoallmyrelations"andis often used in reference to all other living things and not limited to other humans or even to the immediate family or tribal group).
The perceived similarity and relatedness seen in shamanism is consistent with the idea of similarities and connections (i.e., of "relatedness") between humans and nonhuman animals highlighted by developments in Western science. Discoveries in genetics have revealed that organismsof many different specieshaveahighoverlapintheirgeneticcodes, andthusarerelated through their DN A. More tellingly, neuroscientistswithanultimategoalofunderstandinghuman neural function often use giant squid, sea slugs, rats, cats, and nonhuman primates as experimental subjects; such animals are used because their overall nervous system structure is simpler (and so basic principles that govern neural functioning may be more easily studied) or because the invasive experimental procedures necessary for precise experimental cootrol or measurement are usually considered less ethically questionable if carried out on nonhuman animals than if carried out on humans. However, use of such animal models would not be advisable unless neural functioning and elements of neural structure were identical (or at least highly similar). By endorsement of a reductionist strategy, Western science also implies that "we are all related,"albeit without the extension of intentionality and the expansion of the in-group characteristic of shamanism.
Part III: Natural Shamanism and Artificial Intelligence
The extension of intentionality to elements of the natural world was not limited to bipedal animal formssimilartohumans, but also indudeddiverseelementssuchasthe sky, wind, and rain. The extension of intentionality to agi ven element of the natural world typically involved a focus on the behavior ofthat element and the determination ofattributions for why that element behaved as it did. This focusonbehavior,coupledwitharelativelack ofconcern about structural differences between humans and nonhuman elements of the natural world, suggests that ideas and practices in shamanism may assume (or otherwise be based on) a functionalist foundation. Cognitive science was also historically based on a functionalist foundation, and as a consequence emphasized connections between mental states or between mental states and either sensory inputs or motor outputs(e.g., see Dawson 1998;Johnson-Laird 1988) and did not emphasize the substrate in which such connections would be instantiated or embodied. Thus, both cognitive science and shamanism focused on explaining observable behaviors and were not concerned with the nature of the structures necessary to support those behaviors.
The Legacy from Artificial Intelligence
The functionalist basisofcognitive science resulted in a computer metaphor in which"m ind" was equated with "software"and in which"brain"or"body"was equated with "hardware." Software isrelatively independent ofhardware (e.g., the same program may run in different architectures orope rating systems, the same architecture or operating system may run different programs), and so mental processes were conceived to be relatively "disembodied" and independent of specific physical mechanisms. As a consequence, developments in the understanding ofhuman cognition and developments in the ability of humans to construct artificially intelligent devices greatly influencedeachother(e.g.,seeBoden 1987; Crevier 1993 ; Kurzweil 1992) , and some theorists suggested that acorn puter running the appropriate program could"experience"the same mental statesasa human brain runningthe analogous program (e.g., Newell and Simon 1972;Schankand Abelson 1977) . Intriguingly, such an attribution of mental states to nonhuman (and nonorganic) structures such asacomputer is fully consistent with the extensionof intentionality to nonhuman elementsofthe natural world in shamanism. In order to appreciate this point more fully, it would be useful to present a brief digression on the debate regarding computer "thinking" and "understanding."
TheTuringTest. The most well-known proposal for a method to determine whether a computer could be said to think and understand (i.e., to have mental experiences) in the same way that a human could be said to think and understand is named after the mathematician Alan Turing and referred to as the Turing test. The Turing test involves three participants: two humans and one computer. Each participant is placed in a different room, and the only communication between rooms is via typed text messages. One human isgiven the task of determining which of the other two participants is the other person and which is the computer. This person engages the other participants in exchanges of typed text messages, and he or she isallowed toask any question, m ake any statement, and attempt to engage the other participants in conversation on any topic. Based solely on the responses from the other participants, this person must determine which other participant is the other human and which is the computer. The logic of the Turing test is that if the first person cannot tell which other participant isthe other human and which isthe computer, then he or she is not justified in making any cognitive discrimination between the other two participants. If thought and understanding are attributed to the other human, and the computer's responses are indistinguishable from the other human's responses, then thought and understanding must also be attributed to the computer (for discussion, see Dreyfus 1993; Haugeland 1985 ; Weizenbauml976).
The Chinese Room. One rebuttal to theTuring test has been proposed by John Searle (1980, 1992) and become known as the Chinese Room. Imagine a person locked in room, and this person can read and speak only English. In the room is a stack of papers, and each sheet of paper is illustrated with a different apparently meaningless squiggle mark. Also in the room is an instruction manual written in English that specifies which squiggle marks are associated with other squiggle marks. There are two slots in one of the wallsof the room, and sheets of paper illustrated with squiggle marks may enter the room throughone of the slots. When a sheet containing squiggle marks enters the room, the person in the room then looks up those squiggle marks in the manual, finds the appropriate associated sheets from the stack of papers in the room, and passes those associated sheetsout through the otherslot. Unbeknownst to the person inthe room, the squigglesare actually Chinese characters, and on the outside of the room the slot through which sheets are passed into the room is labeled"input"and the slot through which sheets are passed out ofthe room is labeled "output." Over time.the person in the room becomes very fast at finding and passing the appropriate sheets out ofthe Chinese Room. Once this occurs, and from the perspective of a person outside the room, the outputs from the Chinese Room are indistinguishable from those that might be generated by a native Chinese speaker.
The intuition Sear I e hoped his readers would have is that the person in the Chinese Room would not understand Chinese in the same way that a native speaker of Chinese could be said to understand Chinese. According to Searle, all that the person in the room can do is associate one set of apparently arbitrary and meaningless symbols (i.e., one set of squiggles) with another set of apparently arbitrary andmeaninglesssymbols(i.e. another set of squiggles). By analogy,a similar associating of symbolsis all that a computer runninga program can do(e.g., ifthe svmbols"2,""+," "2,"and"= ,"are input into a properly functioning computer, then the symbol"4" will be output, but the computer has no concept or understanding oPfourness"per se). In other words, computers are syntactic (i.e., can implement rules for associating one stimulus with another stimulus) but not semantic (i. e., do not understand the meaning ofthe symbols that are associated). Given that meaning is critical to human forms of understanding, computers therefore could not be said to understand in the same way that humanscould be said to understand. The Chinese Room scenario was meant to suggest a purely behavioral criterion such as theTuring test was inadequate asa measure of thinking or understanding; however, the majority of researchers in artificial intelligence have rejected such a conclusion (e.g., see commentary in Searle 1980; also Boden 1988) .
Shamanic Elements of Artificial Intelligence
On one reading, the Chinese Room scenario may be interpreted as suggesting meaning is not presentin (orunderstoodby)acomputerrunningaprogram. As noted earlier, the sham anicuniver* is saturated with meaning, and so the relative lack of meaning in a purely syntactic computer program might seem to suggest the framework of artificial intelligence is incompatible with the framework of shamanism. However, to the extent that semantics may result from syntax (e.g., Chomsky 1957 Chomsky , 1965 , an artificial intelligence, aswellasaneuralnetworkoraweboflife, might be able tobootstrap meaning from the initial syntactic pattern of connectivity (e.g.,the importance or role of an individual organism or species is determined by the relationship of that organism or species to other elements in the web of life). Given this, the apparent incompatibility between artificial intelligence and shamanism regarding the presence of meaning may be lessenedor even eliminated, and cognition in an artificially intelligent system would be distributed or stretched across the (artificial) mind, activity, and setting (cf. Lave 1993) and functionally connected with "message pathways"intheenvironment(cf. Bateson 1972) .Thus, the relationshipbetween artificial intelligence and shamanism would exhibit the same correspondences and similarities as would the relationship between human cognition and shamanism.
Theemphasison functional connections between mental states in artificial intelligence (and in cognitive science more generally) is consistent with several aspects of shamanism. For example, the importance of functional connections between the neural network of an individual and the larger web of life, as well as the possibility of transmutation, are both consistent with the idea of recreating similar or even identical mental states in a variety of different physical substrates (e.g., in silicon chips and in neural tissue). Along these lines, the extension of intentionality to elements of the natural world, as well as the expansion of the social in-group of the shaman to include nonhuman elements of the natural world, is based on the idea that elements of the natural world possess mental states, beliefs, and desires similartothoseof humans. Thissimilarity isa functional one that occurs regardlessof differences in the physical structure or composition of humansor of other elements in the natural world. In a sense, behaviors of nonhuman elements of the natural world are explained using the same criteria that are used to explain behaviors of other humans.
The functionalist foundation of theory and research in artificial intelligence suggests that behaviors and mental states, rather than physical structure or composition per se, is related to intelligence and understanding. Acceptance by mainstream researchersandtheoristsin artificial intelligenceofabehavioral criterion such as theTuringtest for determining whether"thinking"or "understanding" occurs underscores a surprising convergence of cognitive science and shamanism, astheTuring test explicitly suggests mental states and understanding similar to or even identical with those experienced by humans may be experienced by nonhuman (and nonorganic) structures. In theTuring test and in shamanism, mental states, beliefs and desires are attributed to some object on the basis of a perceived similarity of the behaviors of people and the behaviors of that object. Indeed, if we consider intentionality and the social aspects of shamanism discussed earlier, then a strong form of artificial intelligence (in which human-like mental states and understanding are attributed to a computer running the appropriate program) might even appear as a type of shamanism in which the recipient of the extension of meaning and intentionality is an artificially constructed device rather than an element of the natural world. Given that computer modelsand simulationsof cognitive processes are usually based on verbal protocols(i.e.,verbalizationsofintrospectionsofhum an subjects as they completed various tasks, forreview.seeEricssonand Simon 1993) orotherbenavioralmeasures(e.g.,priming),manysuch models and simulations possess at least a superficial similarity to human cognitive performance. The apparent extension of intentionality to artificially constructed devices, or more specifically, the attribution of thought and understanding to artificially intelligent systems, may thusalso reflect aty peof magical thinking similarto the lawof similarity. In this case, the similarity ofthe"outputs" of a computer and a human would lead to an assumption of similar causes, that is, similar mental states. However, and as has been noted by numerous critics of strong forms ofartificial intelligence, computer simulations ofhurricanes do not experience high winds and flooding, and so why should computer simulationsof cognitive processes experience mental states? Indeed, the attribution of mental states to computers running programsseems very similar to the attribution ofmental states to nonhuman elements of the natural world involved in some action; in both examples, an intentional stance toward a complex and not-completely-understood system is adopted.
Summary and Conclusions
There are numerous correspondences and similarities between ideas in contemporary cognitive science and ideas in shamanism. Connectionist models of semantic memory in cognitive science suggest cognition isdistributed across elements in an individual neural network, and recent accounts in cultural psychology and distributed cognition extend the range of this distribution and suggest cognition is distributed across individuals, artifacts, and elements of the natural world. Therefore, thecognitive processesof an individual may be intimately connected to and distributed across elements of the natural world, and both the individual's neural network and the natural world may be saturated with meaning. The extension of meaning into the natural world results in an individual's neural network being functionally integrated into the larger web of life in the natural world, and this is consistent with the emphasis on interconnection in the shamanic worldview. Cognitive modelsof distributed cognition and shamanic viewsofthe web oflife thus converge on sim ilar notions regarding the im portance ofmeaningfulness in the natural world and the interconnectedness of people with elements of the natural world.
The extension of meaning into the natural world is consistent with the idea that nonhuman elements of the natural world experience human-like beliefs, desires, and other mental states. Consistent with this, shamans may heuristically adopt an intentional stance toward elements of the natural world when faced with problem-solving in the face of uncertainty. Certain typesof magical thinking are more prevalent in shamanic settings than in nonshamanic settings, but this may reflect a difference in degree rather than in kind, as some types of magical thinkingmay simply reflect an extreme application ofheuristicthinking (e.g. .transmutation and the law of similarity might reflect an extreme application of the representativeness heuristic). Shamanic explanations for the behavior of nonhuman elements of nature may exhibit biases such as the fundamental attribution error and in-group/out-groupdifferencesthat are similartononshamanicexplanations forthe behavior ofotherhumans.These biases, coupled with thegeneral use of an intentional stance, suggest that nonhuman elements of the natural world are perceived as similar or related to the human elements of the natural world. Overall, the use of similar heuristics and similar patterns of attribution in shamanicthought and in nonshamanicthought highlight general pattemsin human cognition.
Both sham anism andcognitive science were traditionally based on functionalist foundations in which attributions regarding beliefs, desires, andmentalstatesarebased on behavior and in whidi differences in physical structures are irrelevant to the attribution (e.g., both a storm cloud and a person may act as if angry, even though the physical structures of storm clouds and of persons are very different). Thus, the extension of intentionality to nonhuman elementsof the natural world that occurs in shamanism is consistent with the use of behavioral criteria regarding whether artificially intelligent computer systems may be said to think and understand in the same way that humans may be said to think and understand. Similarly, attributions ofbeliefs, desires, and mental states to an artificially intelligent computer system on the basis ofbehavioral measures (e.g. ,the Turing test) are consistent with attributions of mental states, beliefs, and desires to some element of the natural world on the basis of an extension of intentionality. Furthermore, attributions of beliefs, desires, and mental states to artificially intelligent computer systems on the basis of a behavior (output) that issimilartoorev en identical to that of ahum an may simply reflect an extreme application of the representativeness heuristic, and if so, would be consistent with the suggested role of the representativeness heuristic in magical thinking within shamanism.
In sum, there are a surprising number of correspondences and similarities between ideas in shamanism and ideas in cognitive science. In shamanism and in cognitive science, meaning is extended into the world, and the extension of that meaning has clear social consequences for the attributions that a person may make concerning the behaviors or actions of humans and of nonhuman elements of the natural world. Intriguingly,extensionsof intentionality and attributions of mental states to nonhuman entities are not limited to shamanism, but also appear to occur in contemporary research and theory inthe development of artificial intelligence. Furthermore, even when ideas in shamanism differ from those in cognitive science (e.g., magical thinking), such differences do not reflect pathological or regressive thinking by shamans, but may rather simply reflect a more extreme use of heuristics that are also used by nonshamans and by shamans in nonshamanic settings. Overall, the correspondences and similaritiesbetween ideas in shamanism and ideas in cognitive science do not support the hypothesis that shamanism reflects a pathological or regressive type of thought; rather, the correspondences and similarities between ideas in shamanism and ideasincognitivescience suggest that ideas in shamanism may reflect the application or use of structures and processes used in nonshamanic (and normative) thought.
Author Notes
The author dunks Stanley Krippner for comments on a previous draft of the manuscript. Researchers focused on differences in the time required to answer such questions because people were almost always very accurate, and because there weren't any differences in accuracy, a consideration of accuracy rates wasn't informative regarding the organization of memory. However, differences in response time were consistently found, and researchers used these differences to guide and constrain the development of cognitive models.
"Such a stretching of cognition is also consistent with (1) the possibility that many natural objects and phenomena may be fractal, as the organization and functioning o( networks would be the same at smaller scales (e.g., the nervous system of a single individual) and at larger scales (e.g., a given ecosystem or biome); (2) ecological theories of perception which suggest a dynamic and informationally-rich world presents stimuli that do not require additional processing and that the observer may simply pick up or sample meaning (e.g., Gibson 1979) ; (3) suggestions that cognition reflects the embodiment of the individual within the natural world (e.g., Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1992); and (4) the application of dynamic theory to connect ionist models referred to as semantic fidd theory and which suggests that all physical systems (including humans and nonhuman elements of the natural environment) involve nested semantic fields (e.g., Hardy 1998). Indeed, such a stretching of cognition might also provide a mechanism for the Native American adage that "we are all relited," albeit in computational terms not originally envisioned by Native Americans. Thus, not only is a stretching of cognition consistent with ideas from shamanism, it is also consistent with ideas in several other domains.
